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Secure Voter Verifiable Audit Trail

Srivatsan Sridharan

Abstract


This work aims at creation of a secure voting system. This will be accessible to all voters who have a valid smart card registered officially with age above 18 years. This system provides the following facilities of Voting at any remote terminal, verification of the end users choice and an authentic and secure voting implementation. The voters, without any insider privileges, can cast unlimited votes without being detected by any mechanisms within the voting terminal software is also the major threat yet to be addressed. A basic solution is the voting systems having a voter verifiable secure audit trail, where a computerized voting system might print a paper ballot that can be read and verified by the voter with authenticity being ensured and the confidentiality being maintained. In such a system, the correctness burden on the voting terminal’s code is significantly less as voters can verify a physical object that describes their vote and are allowed to vote in terminal only after their identity is proved by series of authentication procedures.

Keywords


Biometrics, Fingerprint Recognition, Repository, Security, Smart Cards.

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.36039/AA082013002

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