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Data Leakage Detection
Abstract
A data distributor has given sensitive data to a set of supposedly trusted agents (third parties). Some of the data are leaked and found in an unauthorized place (e.g., on the web or somebody’s laptop). The distributor must assess the likelihood that the leaked data came from one or more agents, as opposed to having been independently gathered by other means. We propose data allocation strategies (across the agents) that improve the probability of identifying leakages. These methods do not rely on alterations of the released data (e.g., watermarks). In some cases, we can also inject “realistic but fake” data records to further improve our chances of detecting leakage and identifying the guilty party.
Keywords
Allocation Strategies, Data Leakage, Perturbation, Fake Records, Leakage Model.
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