Malicious Packet Dropping Detection in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks based on Public Auditing Architecture

Abstract

Malicious package shedding and link error are usually a pair of sources for packet failures in wireless ad hoc networks. In this particular paper, while observing a sequence of packet failures in wireless ad hoc network, we are interested in identifying if the failures are usually due to link errors only, or because of the merged effect of link errors and malicious fall. We are in particular focussed on the insider-attack case, where malicious nodes which are part of a path take advantage of its knowledge for selectively dropping a small amount of packets critical for the system.  Since the packet shedding rate throughout this specific case is just like the actual channel error rate, conventional algorithms that use actual packet shedding rate cannot obtain acceptable detection precision. To enhance the actual detection precision, we propose to take advantage of the actual correlations concerning missing packets. Also, to make sure trustworthy calculations of the correlations, we employ a homomorphic linear authenticator (HLA) centered public auditing structure that enables the sensor to confirm the honesty of the packet shedding information reported by individual nodes. This development is privateness conserving, collusion proof, and also incurs reduced communication and storage overheads. With the use of comprehensive models, we confirm that the suggested scheme obtain substantially far better detection precision when compared with conventional strategies.